What Does It Mean to be Human, and Not Animal? Examining Montaigne’s Literary Persuasiveness in “Man is No Better Than the Animals” by Collins, Rory
 1 
What Does It Mean to be Human, and Not Animal? 
Examining Montaigne’s Literary Persuasiveness in 
“Man is No Better Than the Animals” 
 
Rory W. Collins 
University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
 
Published in Sloth: A Journal of Emerging Voices in Human-Animal Studies, 4(1), 2018* 
  
 
Abstract: Michel de Montaigne famously argued in “Man is No 
Better Than the Animals” that humans and non-human animals 
cannot be dichotomized based on language or reasoning abilities, 
among other characteristics. This article examines a selection of 
writing features at play in the text and discusses how successfully 
they convey Montaigne’s claims. Throughout, I argue that Montaigne 
presents a superficially convincing case for doubting a categorical 
distinction between humans and animals on linguistic and rational 
grounds through the use of rhetorical questions, listing, appeals to 
authority, point of view, imagery, and narrative anecdotes. However, 
Montaigne’s rejection of a human/animal distinction appears self-
refuting since the form and content of his text both suggest that 
humans typically possess some degree of unique language and 
reasoning capacities. 
  
 
The question of what it means to be human, when viewed through an essentialist 
lens, can be addressed by defining what important characteristics or abilities 
distinguish humans from non-human animals (hereafter animals). Michel de 
Montaigne argues that such dichotomizing is unjustified in “Man is No Better Than 
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the Animals,” an excerpt from his Apology for Raymond Sebond (1580–92). In the 
text, he examines an abundance of possible defining features of humanity, but for 
clarity, this article focuses on just two: language abilities and rational thought.1 
Herein, I critically examine the form and content of Montaigne’s text and judge its 
literary persuasiveness for readers accordingly. My discussion focuses largely on 
contemporary readers, but, where relevant, I also consider how historical readers may 
have responded to Montaigne’s writing. Specifically, I analyze the use of rhetorical 
questions, listing, appeals to authority, point of view, imagery, and narrative 
anecdotes. I conclude that although the text is convincing in parts, much of its force 
derives from Montaigne’s calculated use of literary techniques as opposed to his logical 
arguments. Indeed, Montaigne’s skillful use of language and reasoning suggests, 
ironically, that humans may well possess unique abilities in both these respects. 
 
Since its first publication, Montaigne’s text has posed a challenge to the deeply 
entrenched view that humans are superior to animals across various dimensions 
(Foglia 2014). Contemporary interpretations have generally found the arguments it 
contains insightful and Montaigne’s writing eloquent. George Boas (1933) asserts “the 
general impression which one derives from this essay is…that we are not better—if not 
worse—than the beasts” (9). Equally charitable readings persist among more recent 
critics, who often view Montaigne’s text as an erudite contribution to debates in 
human-animal studies.2 Laurie Shannon (2013) illustrates this in claiming that 
Montaigne “may be the most sweeping expositor of the scientific 
experiment/imaginative act that zoographic critique entails” (134) and that his text 
“scatters the traditional hierarchy” (193) of humans being thought above other 
animals. Furthermore, James Ramsey Wallen (2015) remarks that Montaigne’s text 
“offer[s] fertile ground today for thinking and rethinking the human/animal 
distinction” (476). Recent critical readings, however, usually consider “Man is No 
Better Than the Animals” within the context of Montaigne’s larger body of work (e.g. 
Melehy 2006; Randall 2014; Shannon 2013). Few, if any, sustained discussions 
concentrate solely on this particular section of the Apology. This article contributes 
 
1 Many points I discuss also apply to other aspects Montaigne considers, however. 
2 Montaigne’s text features in Niall Shanks’ (2002) Animals and Science: A Guide to the Debates, as 
well as Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald’s (2007) The Animals Reader, an anthology of “essential 
classic and contemporary writings” according to its subtitle. 
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to the existing literature by giving “Man is No Better Than the Animals” the focused 
and thorough critical analysis it deserves. 
 
Additionally, there has been somewhat limited attention in past interpretations 
toward examining how, through destabilizing the species boundary, “Man is No Better 
Than the Animals” addresses the question of what it means to be human. Wallen 
(2015) briefly considers this aspect of the text, noting that some passages “might be 
read as early examples of posthumanist theory/rhetoric” (450). Ayesha 
Ramachandran (2015) also acknowledges the text’s contribution to this question but 
does so only fleetingly within a broader discussion about Renaissance humanism (8–
9). Consequently, this article works toward ameliorating the gap in the current 
literature by analyzing how Montaigne’s text scrutinizes what it means to be human. 
 
In biological terms, to be human is to possess DNA which sufficiently resembles a 
typical Homo sapiens genome. Where precisely to draw such a line of sufficiency is 
controversial, but wherever one chooses to place the cut-off point, this criterion 
provides a plausible scientific demarcation. However, it fails to address what it means 
to be human; at best, DNA defines what it is to be human. If “meaning” is taken to 
denote the “significance, purpose, underlying truth, etc., of something” (Oxford 
English Dictionary Online 2018) then DNA will clearly not suffice. If somebody 
discovered that due to a strange genetic deformity, their DNA had mutated such that 
it was no longer “human,” this would not detract from the value or meaningfulness 
of their existence. Thus, defining what it means to be human via such an essentialist 
interpretation requires isolating one or more characteristics or attributes that are 
central to the significance of human life. 
 
There is an important distinction, however, between “human” and “person.” In the 
philosophical literature, the term “human” is synonymous with “member of Homo 
sapiens” while “person” refers to any entity—be they human, chimpanzee, robot, or 
alien—who possesses, to some degree, capacities such as “rationality, command of 
language, self-consciousness, control or agency, and moral worth” (Oxford Dictionary 
of Philosophy 2016). Consequently, defining what it means to be human must be 
distinguished from clarifying what it means to be a person. Such definitions have 
proven crucial in recent legal cases contesting what rights should be afforded to non-
humans such as chimpanzees (Holtum 2017). The question at hand might, therefore, 
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be suitably rephrased as follows: what significant characteristics, if any, do humans 
possess but animals do not, which give meaning to human life? 
 
It is this formulation which Montaigne addresses in “Man is No Better Than the 
Animals.” To do so, he considers various potential criteria for distinguishing humans 
from the rest of the animal kingdom including language, rationality, altruism, 
emotional capacity, and soul possession, among others. Montaigne begins by 
criticizing the arrogance of humans who presume their superiority over animals 
without good reason—“Presumption is our natural and original malady” (401)—and 
argues it is by this “vanity” that man “attributes to himself divine characteristics” 
(401). This introduction effectively primes readers to duly consider the claims 
presented in the body of the text. Characterizing those who hold unwarranted 
assumptions about humans’ abilities as being presumptuous and vain is likely to result 
in readers wanting to distance themselves from this position. Further, in this opening 
section, Montaigne questions the anthropocentrism common during the early modern 
period through an epigrammatic rhetorical question: “When I play with my cat, who 
knows if I am not a pastime to her more than she is to me?” (401). Through this, 
readers are encouraged to cast aside their pre-existing speciesism and approach the 
subsequent arguments from a less biased perspective than they otherwise might. 
 
As the text continues, Montaigne “tests” the many proposed human/animal 
distinctions by swiftly transitioning between historical material, personal experiences, 
and empirical evidence to show that animals demonstrate exceptional abilities often 
attributed solely to humans. Though some sections mainly focus on a central topic—
Montaigne dedicates two pages in the early part of the text to discussing language 
(402–03) and concentrates on rationality through four consecutive pages later (412–
15)—he frequently switches attention between key concepts. Language reappears as 
an important point in several places, as does rationality.3 Such rapid shifts in ideas, 
combined with Montaigne’s prolific use of anecdotes, quotations, and rhetorical 
questions, bombard readers such that they often may not scrutinise his arguments 
before being quickly led to another point. This abundance of information, in 
conjunction with the mockery of those who hold anthropocentric ideas in the first few 
 
3 For language, see pages 407–08, 412, 416; for rationality, see pages 404, 406, 408–09, 411, 416, 418–
19, 421–22, 434. 
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paragraphs, may pressure readers to accept Montaigne’s claims without carefully 
contemplating the quality of arguments or evidence provided. 
 
Comparing the human and animal faculties for language and communication is a 
prominent theme throughout the text. Montaigne integrates a variety of writing 
techniques to argue that humans and animals are unable to be easily distinguished on 
their language capabilities including rhetorical questions, listing, and appeals to 
authority. Notably, he combines these features to maximize their effects. Montaigne 
generally does not use rhetorical questions to present standalone claims but rather 
strategically places them toward the end of more developed arguments to solidify his 
point before moving on. For instance, after paraphrasing Plato’s conception of the 
Golden Age where humans and animals communicated with one another, Montaigne 
asks, “Do we need a better proof to judge man’s impudence with regard to the beasts?” 
(402). The question could well be answered affirmatively—Plato was wrong on many 
topics, and perhaps his interpretation of Greek mythology is one of them—but 
Montaigne’s placement of the rhetorical device subtly induces readers to side with his 
position without attempting to answer the question. Classical writings held sway over 
much of Western thought in the early modern era, and hence Plato’s argument 
provides a widely accepted, albeit fallible, “proof” for Montaigne’s position. 
Immediately afterward, Montaigne even describes Plato as “That great author” (402), 
further establishing the role of the question as being merely to fortify readers’ pre-
existing affiliation with respected classical works. 
 
Later on, Montaigne employs listing to build his case against the human/animal 
language distinction further. After explaining some examples of inter-species 
communication among animals—“In a certain bark of the dog the horse knows there 
is anger” (402)— Montaigne claims that “Even in the beasts that have no voice, from 
the mutual services we see between them we easily infer some other means of 
communication; their motions converse and discuss” (402). Montaigne anticipates the 
objection that this non-verbal communication is insufficiently complex to be equated 
with the sophisticated language skills humans possess, so as a counterargument he 
provides an extensive list of non-verbal communication among humans: 
 
What of the hands? We beg, we promise, call, dismiss, threaten, pray, entreat, 
deny, refuse, question, admire, count, confess, repent, fear, blush, doubt, 
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instruct, command, incite, encourage, swear, testify, accuse, condemn, absolve, 
insult, despise, defy, vex, flatter, applaud, bless, humiliate, mock, reconcile, 
commend, exalt, entertain, rejoice, complain, grieve, mope, despair, wonder, 
exclaim, are silent, and what not, with a variation and multiplication of the 
tongue. (403) 
 
This ad nauseam list may overwhelm readers with information, thereby lulling them 
into complacency and reducing their likelihood of attempting to falsify Montaigne’s 
claims. There are several examples provided which are less than convincing. For 
instance, it is rarely the case that people can promise or flatter with their hands alone; 
rather, hand gestures serve to accentuate verbal expressions. In fairness to Montaigne, 
however, the majority of his examples are reasonably sound and hence suggest that 
an anthropocentric focus on verbal language above other forms is unjustified. Thus, 
Montaigne’s use of listing persuades readers that body language is more complex than 
might be first thought. Animals, then, may communicate in more sophisticated ways 
than humans often give them credit for, and human language skills could reasonably 
be deemed less exceptional as a result. 
 
There are many cases where Montaigne uses quotations from authority figures to 
provide additional support for the claim that humans cannot be distinguished from 
animals on linguistic grounds. Scholars have noted Montaigne often borrows heavily 
from ancient works throughout much of his writing (Melehy 2005, 274; Randall 2014, 
16). Among those whom he quotes directly in the text (he paraphrases several others) 
are Lucretius (402, 407, 408), Tasso (403), Dante (407), and Martial (416). All are 
well-known classical figures: precisely what was required to appeal to educated readers 
during the early modern period. Incorporating such material demonstrates that 
Montaigne himself was well-read and that his ideas were consistent with classical 
writers, thus helping to persuade historical readers. 
 
Interestingly, though, the quotations add little to the substance of Montaigne’s 
argument. Some merely repeat what Montaigne has already said, such as when he 
writes, “we discover very evidently that there is full and complete communication 
between [animals] and that they understand each other” and follows this with a 
quotation from Lucretius: “Even dumb cattle and the savage beasts / Varied and 
different noises do employ / When they feel fear or pain, or thrill with joy” (402). 
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This only rehashes what Montaigne has previously stated; it does not further develop 
his line of reasoning. Other quotations such as “Likewise in children, the tongue’s 
speechlessness / Leads them to gesture what they would express” (402), also from 
Lucretius, are poetically phrased— hence giving a certain mellifluousness to the text 
through their rhyme— but add little to Montaigne’s substantive points. His purpose 
for using such quotations is often not to assist in constructing cogent arguments, but 
rather to impress and flatter the reader while at the same time increasing the text’s 
flow and eloquence.4 
 
Montaigne’s rejection of a language-based distinction between humans and animals 
is, on the whole, unconvincing. He does make a strong case that animals have some 
level of communication skills (402–03, 407) and correctly notes that young children 
and inhabitants of “a far country” (416) may have limited language abilities. However, 
this fails to disprove that humans and animals do, typically, show a significant 
discrepancy in their capacity to use language effectively. Montaigne’s own writing is 
a case in point: he uses rhetorical questions both to dispel assumptions and subtly 
influence readers, listing to inundate and provide evidence, and quotations to flatter 
and enhance the text’s fluency. Written language itself is uniquely human, at least by 
most understandings of what constitutes writing. Animals may possess some language 
skills, but most humans, like Montaigne, have language abilities far exceeding these. 
The linguistic discrepancy between humans and animals, then, may not be categorical 
but is of a significant enough degree that a distinction may reasonably be drawn. 
 
A possible explanation for why humans alone use language so fluently and 
purposefully is because only humans possess rationality. This view was prevalent 
during Montaigne’s time, stemming in part from Thomas Aquinas’ claim that the 
ability to reason separates humans from other species (Frampton 2011, 101). 
Montaigne disagreed with this and argued that humans and animals cannot be 
dichotomised on the basis of rationality any more than they can on language abilities. 
In the text, he attempts to show that animals exhibit sophisticated reasoning 
capacities too. He elucidates this point through various techniques including point of 
 
4 Critics have acknowledged Montaigne’s skillful use of this writing style. Sarah Bakewell (2010) goes 
as far as saying that “Montaigne neither argues nor persuades; he does not need to, for 
he seduces” (148). 
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view, figurative language, and narrative anecdotes, which together project a seemingly 
plausible position at first glance. 
 
Point of view is among Montaigne’s most essential methods of encouraging readers to 
question whether rationality is a uniquely human attribute. Montaigne constructs a 
personal, embodied, intimate point of view throughout the text—characteristic of his 
writing—through the use of tone and the balancing of singular and plural first-person 
pronouns. In one part, Montaigne writes with a sensitive and empathetic tone to 
depict animals and the natural world sentimentally: he describes birds as caring for 
the “tender limbs of their little ones” (404) and characterises Nature itself as having 
a “maternal tenderness” (404). In other sections, he uses a more humorous tone, one 
instance being when, after providing a series of examples of animal reasoning, he 
writes that animals’ “brutish stupidity surpasses in all conveniences all that our divine 
intelligence can do” (404). This mocking tone mimics the vocabulary Montaigne 
attributes to his opponents earlier on, and so by ridiculing the anthropocentric 
position he encourages readers to echo his rejection of the orthodox view. 
 
In conjunction with his sagacious use of tone, Montaigne’s variation of pronouns 
induces readers to assent to his arguments while at the same time establishing an 
amiable and casual author-persona. Inclusive pronouns, notably the first-person plural 
“we,” draw readers in when Montaigne describes observations of animal intelligence 
they are unlikely to have seen directly: “we see the goats of Candia, if they have 
received an arrow wound, go and pick out dittany out of a million herbs for their 
cure” (411); “In the way the tunnies live we observe a singular knowledge of three 
parts of mathematics” (428). By contrast, Montaigne uses singular first-person 
pronouns in various parts to emphasise his active presence as a communicator: “So, I 
say, to return to my subject” (408); “I observe with more amazement the 
behaviour…of the dogs that blind men use” (412); “I do not want to omit citing 
another example of a dog” (414). This careful balance between plural and singular 
forms, coupled with the many instances of Montaigne’s empathetic and emotionally 
responsive tone, presents the text through a deeply personal, embodied point of view. 
Readers are prompted to side with the persona Montaigne constructs and hence accept 
the arguments he provides. 
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Further strengthening his case against the human/animal divide are several instances 
where Montaigne uses figurative language to present human rationality as less 
spectacular than often thought. In one section, Montaigne discusses the complaint 
some have voiced toward nature for making humans “the only animal abandoned 
naked on the naked earth” (405), that is, having skin rather than a protective 
exoskeleton or heat-retaining fur. He sarcastically describes these “vulgar complaints” 
through a metaphor: “the license of their opinions now raises them above the clouds, 
and then sinks them to the antipodes” (405). This comparison holds theological 
connotations and parallels the uncharitable description of the anthropocentric position 
given earlier in the text: 
 
He feels and sees himself lodged here…farthest from the vault of heaven…and 
in his imagination he goes planting himself above the circle of the moon, and 
bringing the sky down beneath his feet…. He equals himself to God, attributes 
to himself divine characteristics, picks himself out and separates himself from 
the horde of other creatures. (401) 
 
The metaphor, then, can be interpreted in light of the previous passage. Claiming a 
person’s arrogant opinions “raises them above the clouds” invokes images of Heaven, 
perhaps intended to attack the commonly held belief that humans are superior since 
God created animals with the intention that humans should have dominion over them 
(see Genesis 1:26–28). Montaigne uses “antipode” in accordance with the term’s 
geographical definition, meaning the point on Earth which is diametrically opposite a 
given location.5 Thus, by describing people’s opinions as “sink[ing] them to the 
antipodes,” Montaigne means that holding these arrogant and rationally unjustified 
views will not grant access to the place “above the clouds,” Heaven, but to its 
geographical opposite, Hell. People’s dissatisfaction with what Nature has endowed 
them will, in the long run, only cause them unhappiness. Montaigne’s metaphor for 
the irrationality of people complaining about their natural faculties creates a palpable 
image of Heaven and Hell. Doing so showcases how vain such a belief is, due to the 
comparison to Heaven, and how possessing these thoughts may entail negative 
ramifications by “sink[ing] them to the antipodes.” This metaphor, therefore, 
illustrates what Montaigne considers a clear example of human irrationality. 
 
5 The term “antipodes” could not refer to Australasia since the region had not yet been colonized at 
the time of Montaigne’s writing. 
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Montaigne’s attack on such “vulgar complaints” is not limited to figurative language, 
however. Immediately afterward, he gives several plausible counterexamples to the 
idea that having skin somehow disadvantages humans. For instance, he notes that 
there are “many nations who have not yet tried the use of any clothes” (405) and 
others who have been frugal in their use: “Our ancient Gauls wore hardly any clothes; 
nor do the Irish, our neighbors, under so cold a sky” (405). Through these reasoned, 
empirical observations, readers are led to understand that the prevailing dependence 
on clothing is not necessary for survival but is instead a social custom. However, this 
whole section of the text comes across as one extended straw-man argument. 
Presumably, it is only a minority of the population who truly voice complaints against 
having skin rather than fur. So, although Montaigne’s use of both figurative language 
and empirical evidence suggests that humans can act less rationally than often 
thought, this point does not generalize sufficiently to show that humans are, on the 
whole, more irrational than commonly believed. Montaigne’s seemingly eloquent prose 
is undercut by the lack of substance in his overall claim here. 
 
There are numerous examples given throughout to show Montaigne’s other major 
point: that animals exhibit greater rationality than people usually credit them with. 
These often take the form of anecdotal and historical stories which, as Boria Sax 
(2013) notes, is a technique many writers have used over the centuries to show the 
complexity of animals’ emotions and intelligence (74). In one example, Montaigne 
describes a story of a fox who is said to “bring his ear very near the ice, to hear 
whether the water running beneath sounds near or far” (409). Montaigne suggests we 
would “not have reason to suppose that there passes through his head the same 
reasoning that would pass through ours, and that it is a ratiocination and conclusion 
drawn from natural common sense” (409). There are many other stories of animal 
intelligence throughout the text, including a magpie memorizing and repeating a 
complex tune (414), a dog placing stones in a partially filled bucket of oil so it could 
lick the oil after it rose to the top (414), and Thales’ mule who, when loaded with 
sacks of salt, lowered himself into a river to decrease the weight (421). 
 
These cases seem to be impressive examples of animal reasoning and intelligence, but 
only if interpreted without knowledge or consideration of other plausible accounts of 
animal behavior. In the fox story, for instance, the animal’s actions may not 
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demonstrate the sort of intelligent cognitive processes Montaigne suggests. René 
Descartes opposed Montaigne on this point, arguing that such animal behavior could 
be explained as the result of “passions” rather than reasoning (Melehy 2006, 264). 
Modern-day readers may explain the fox’s behavior as a consequence of 
straightforward operant conditioning. When, after hearing the water sounding a 
particular way, the ice breaks and the fox is unpleasantly submerged, this may deter 
the fox from crossing the river after hearing similar sounds in the future, assuming it 
survives the ordeal—positive punishment, in psychological terms. Likewise, when the 
water flow creates a different noise, and after hearing this the fox is not submerged, 
this may reinforce the same behavior in the future. This process does not require the 
sophisticated intellectual abilities Montaigne proposes. Similarly, the other stories can 
be explained without animals possessing meaningful rationality. Their persuasiveness 
relies on readers being willing to go along with Montaigne’s implied explanations. 
Niall Shanks (2002) describes Montaigne as “an astute observer of animal behavior” 
(45). But this judgment seems somewhat too charitable since if readers consider the 
many credible alternative explanations to Montaigne’s, his claim that animals exhibit 
intelligent reasoning fails to hold any water. 
 
To briefly recap, there are two approaches Montaigne takes throughout the text to 
discredit the rationality distinction between humans and animals. The first is 
revealing humans to be less rational than typically thought, which he strives to do 
through figurative language and appeals to empirical evidence. However, his straw-
man tactics let him down in the case described above, and at best he shows that some 
people hold a particular irrational belief while failing to show that humans are, 
generally speaking, no better than the animals. The second approach Montaigne takes 
is to show that animals are more rational than they are given credit for, mainly 
through anecdotal stories. But to be convincing, these stories must be read without 
contemplating other reasonable explanations to those provided, which perhaps much 
of Montaigne’s original audience, but fewer contemporary readers, are likely to do. 
 
Ironically, Montaigne’s own writing can be used once more to show that humans and 
animals may be distinguishable on rational as well as linguistic grounds. His carefully 
constructed author-persona through variations in tone and pronouns, his creative use 
of figurative language to argue his case, and his many appeals to empirical 
observations of animal behavior all demonstrate a level of rationality and intellect 
 12 
above that which animals seem to express. As with language, the difference between 
humans and animals may not be categorical since animals do exhibit some forms of 
reasoning. Humans, however, appear to possess a degree of rationality beyond that 
which has been observed in animals, and Montaigne himself exemplifies this. 
 
Looking back now over the text as a whole, Montaigne addresses the issue of what it 
means to be human by asserting an unconventional position for his time: that many 
of the proposed criteria are unsatisfactory since humans are no better than the animals 
in these respects. Among these, he critiques linguistic and rational distinctions as 
potential qualities for being human rather than animal. Montaigne employs a wide 
array of literary techniques to try to persuade readers on this point, but these are 
convincing only to a limited extent. Though he manages to show that the 
human/animal divide is not strictly categorical, Montaigne fails to demonstrate that 
humans are no better than the animals in either of these aspects. 
 
Ultimately, it is the reliance on superficial arguments without rigorous analysis that 
lets Montaigne down; his eloquent prose, itself indicative of supra-animal language 
and reasoning skills, cannot substitute for logical argumentation. The literary 
practices Montaigne employs may well have been among the most effective means of 
convincing readers when the text was first published. However, for those willing to 
look beyond the text’s rhetorical façade, many of Montaigne’s claims appear less than 
persuasive. This is not to say that humans and animals are necessarily distinguishable 
on linguistic and rational grounds—the contemporary literature offers many plausible 
reasons to question whether they can be—but simply that Montaigne fails to show 
that such human/animal dichotomies are unjustified in “Man is No Better Than the 
Animals.” On the basis of this text, at least, what it means to be human as opposed 
to animal may very well include language abilities and the possession of rationality.6 
  
 
6 I owe many thanks to Philip Armstrong for his superb teaching and valuable criticism of an earlier 
draft, and to Bianca Falbo and two anonymous reviewers for their exceptionally helpful comments. 
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